Greening the WTO : EGA, tariff concessions and policy likeness by MAVROIDIS, Petros C. & NEVEN, Damien J.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RSCAS 2019/07 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Global Governance Programme-333 
 
Greening the WTO 
EGA, tariff concessions and policy likeness 
 
Petros C. Mavroidis and Damien J. Neven 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
European University Institute 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Global Governance Programme 
 
Greening the WTO 
EGA, tariff concessions and policy likeness 
Petros C. Mavroidis and Damien J. Neven 
 
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2019/07 
 
  
 
  
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s).  
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper, or other series, the year and the publisher. 
 
 
 
ISSN 1028-3625 
© Petros C. Mavroidis and Damien J. Neven, 2019 
Printed in Italy, January 2019 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, created in 1992 and currently directed by 
Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the 
major issues facing the process of European integration, European societies and Europe’s place 
in 21st century global politics. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes, 
projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The 
research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, 
reflecting the changing agenda of European integration, the expanding membership of the 
European Union, developments in Europe’s neighbourhood and the wider world. 
For more information: http://eui.eu/rscas 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s). 
 
The Global Governance Programme 
The Global Governance Programme is one of the flagship programmes of the Robert Schuman Centre. 
It is a community of outstanding professors and scholars, that produces high quality research and 
engages with the world of practice through policy dialogue. Established and early-career scholars work 
on issues of global governance within and beyond academia, focusing on four broad and 
interdisciplinary areas: Global Economics, Europe in the World, Cultural Pluralism and Global 
Citizenship. 
The Programme also aims to contribute to the fostering of present and future generations of policy and 
decision makers through its executive training programme: the Academy of Global Governance, where 
theory and ‘real world’ experience meet and where leading academics, top-level officials, heads of 
international organisations and senior executives discuss on topical issues relating to global governance. 
For more information: http://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu 
 
The European University Institute and the Robert Schuman Centre are not responsible for the opinions 
expressed by the author(s). 
 
 
 

  
Abstract 
This paper considers the APEC and EGA agreements which grant tariff concession through HS 
classifications beyond the six digit level ("ex outs") in favour of "green" goods and discuss how these 
initiatives fit into the WTO legal regime. Even if the practical significance of the APEC agreement 
should not be overestimated as it involves modest tariff concessions over a subset of goods which are 
not heavily traded, these agreements involve a paradigm shift to the extent that they use tariffs 
concessions negotiated on a plurilateral basis as a policy instrument to meet public policy concern, 
instead of making market access conditional on meeting national regulations. We find that there is a 
tension between the current definition of likeness for the enforcement of MFN provisions and the use of 
ex outs and a risk that improved market access for ex outs could be seen a de facto discrimination. One 
way out of this conundrum is to define likeness in terms of policy rationales.  
Keywords 
WTO, APEC, EGA, Tariffs, Terms of Trade, ex outs 
JEL Classification: K40 
 

1 Introduction1
This paper focuses on the recent (plurilateral) initiatives to reduce tariﬀs on
“environmentally-friendly” or "green" goods. There are two iniatives on this
front; first, the APEC (Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation) initiative which
involves a voluntary reduction of tariﬀs across 21 WTO members2 and 54 prod-
ucts categories at the 6 digit level of the Harmonized system (HS), and second,
the EGA (Environmental Goods Agreement) in which a number of other WTO
members attempt to include tariﬀ reductions on the APEC list of products in
their schedules of concessions.
In these agreements, participating countries create new subcategories of
products that are meant to be environmentally friendly (so called, "ex outs")
within HS categories and provide lower tariﬀs for these products. For instance,
a new subcategory labeled solar heaters was introduced among the category of
‘instantaneous or storage water heaters’ ( HS 841919). The tariﬀ applied to
this subcategory is lower than the tariﬀ applied to others goods in the six digit
category, reflecting the objective to encourage the imports of environmentally
friendly goods. APEC target was to ensure that signatories would reduce duties
for the listed goods to maximum 5% ad valorem.
APEC members have now, in large part, implemented the agreed tariﬀ re-
ductions and apply them on a most favored nation (MFN) basis. The EGA
negotiations are, at the time of writing, still inconclusive.
The APEC and the EGA might represent a paradigm shift with respect to
the way in which public policy concerns are dealt with in the WTO.
The GATT discipline was, for all practical purposes, a tariﬀ bargain with
insurance against concession erosion that might arise because of domestic reg-
ulations, possibly reflecting legitimate public policy concerns. Tariﬀs would be
curbed through ‘tariﬀ bindings’ (tariﬀ concessions), a promise to the eﬀect that
the level of tariﬀs would not increase above and beyond a multilaterally agreed
threshold. Concession erosion would be adressed by the commitment that do-
mestic policies, e.g., policies applied to domestic goods and imported goods
after customs clearance, should be applied in nondiscriminatory manner. Since
domestic policies were unilaterally defined (as opposed to tariﬀs that were mul-
tilaterally negotiated), nondiscrimination would guarantee that trading nations
would not be in position to provide domestic goods with an advantage beyond
that embedded in tariﬀ protection. For instance, domestic policies in favor of
1We would like to thank Kyle Bagwell, Chad P. Bown, Henrik Horn, Doug Irwin, Joost
Pauwelyn, Bob Staiger and Alan Sykes for helpful comments on previous drafts. Daniele
Rinaldo provided excellent research assistance and in many ways is our shadow co-author.
Suja Rishikesh, Marc Bacchetta, Adelina Nenette C. Mendoza, Florian Eberth, Roy Santana
and Carsten Steinfatt at the WTO very generously shared their expertise on trade date and
the negotiations with us. The project leading to this paper has received funding from the
European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement
No 770680.
2Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Indonesia, Japan, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore,
Thailand, USA, Vietnam
1
the environement should not discriminate in favor of domestic goods3.
Hence, whereas environmental protection normally takes the form of regu-
lation for which trading nations have discretion subject to the discipline of non
discrimination, the APEC and the EGA approaches it through tariﬀ prefer-
ences.
The paper is organised a follows. Section 2 provides further background on
the APEC and EGA agreements. Section 3 provides an overview of the outcome
of APEC negotiations. We find that there are only 14 countries (out of 21) for
which the APEC agreement is relevant as some countries had nothing to adjust
in the first place and some others did not implement any change. We also find
that the share of trade aﬀected by the concessions is very small, mostly because
the 54 products concerned by the agreement are not heavily traded. Second,
focusing on these products, we find that the tariﬀ preference granted under the
agreement are on average quite modest. This does not come as surprise given
that outstanding tariﬀs are generally rather low. Still, there is a great disparity
across countries; Mexico is outlier with a (trade weighted) average reduction of
tariﬀs in excess of 10%. Korea and to a lesser extent Vietnam, Russia, Canada
and China have also granted significant concessions. At the other extremes, the
concessions are negligible for the US (as well as the Philippines and Indonesia).
Section 4 discusses how the APEC and EGA agreements fit into the WTO
system. We discuss alternative options for legalizing them and the current legal
status of these agreements. We find that there is a tension between the current
definition of likeness for the enforcement of MFN provisions and the use of ex
outs. There is also a risk that improved maket access for goods coming under
ex outs could be seen a de facto discrimination. One way out of this conudrum
is to define likeness in terms of policy rationales. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background on APEC and EGA negotiations
As mentioned above, the APEC and EGA negotiations involve the definition
of tariﬀs beyond the six digit level. The approach towards the level of tariﬀ
concessions has changed since the early GATT days. Some WTO members con-
tinued negotiating at the HS six-digit level, where tariﬀ lines are expressed in
a ‘regulation-neutral’ manner. Others nevertheless, have stopped doing so. In-
deed, the post-Tokyo round era marks the widespread negotiation of concessions
at the eight-, ten-, or twelve-digit level. At first, it was the European Union (EU)
and the United States (US) that had adopted this approach. Many industrial-
ized countries, members of the OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation
3Nonviolation complaints is an additional, GATT idiosyncratic, element that protects
concessions, allowing aﬀected trading nations to request compensation for lost (expected)
trade resulting from otherwise GATT-consistent measures. The rationale for this legal in-
strument was that the GATT contract was (necessarily) incomplete, and a number of poli-
cies that had not found their way into the contract explicitly could (negatively) aﬀect the
value of tariﬀ concessions. The best example of successful nonviolation complaints concerns
litigation against subsidies, an instrument that only gradually came under the multilateral
disciplines.
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and Development) have since emulated the attitude of the trans-Atlantic part-
ners. Article 3.3 of HS allows for subclassifications of the six-digit harmonized
classifications of all goods:
Nothing in this Article shall prevent a Contracting Party from estab-
lishing, in its Customs tariﬀ or statistical nomenclatures, subdivi-
sions classifying goods beyond the level of the Harmonized system,
provided that any such subdivision is added and coded at a level
beyond that of the six-digit numerical code set out in the Annex to
this Convention.
Subclassifications can be unilateral (the majority of times so far), plurilateral
or multilateral. The negotiation of the APEC list is the first plurilateral eﬀort.
Importantly, however, the subcategories are not (so far) harmonised, so that dif-
ferent countries have diﬀerent subcategories. Countries can thus express their
societal preferences through elaborate tariﬀ lines instead of regulation. The
original (pre-EGA) unilateral recourse towards elaborate classifications is to
some extent paradoxical, as the whole purpose of the ‘Brussels Nomenclature’,
and the Harmonized System (HS) that it led to, was to introduce a common
language to describe goods on which tariﬀ concessions would be subsequently
negotiated. It was felt nevertheless, that a balance had to be struck between
uniform tariﬀ descriptions, and “breathing” space for those trading nations that
produced wider range of goods and their varieties. The APEC and EGA ne-
gotiations are an application of the possibility oﬀered through Article 3.3 of
HS.
Vossenaar (2014) and (2016) provides a very comprehensive discussion of the
negotiation of the APEC list of environmental goods. The 21 APEC members
essentially pledged that the tariﬀ imposed on various environmental goods would
not exceed 5% by the end of 2015. The APEC negotiators worked on the basis
of HS commitments and had to devise ex outs, that is, subheadings that covered
environmental goods only out of a wider category, which as mentioned above,
might diﬀer across countries4 . The APEC tariﬀ reductions have not, at the
moment of writing, been incorporated into national schedules. Nevertheless,
APEC members already apply them on voluntary basis. As already stated
supra, they are applied on MFN-basis5 .
4The full list of products covered, as well as the ex outs, that is the products that
come under the HS 6 headings that qualify as environmental goods is accessible in
https://www.apec.org
Since ex outs are usually expressed at the eight-digit level, their numbering might diﬀer
across national schedules. The reader will have to compare national descriptions of the eight
digit headings in order to evaluate commensurability of concessions entered. On the overall
level of duties, see Bown and Irwin (2016). Hoekman and Mavroidis (2017) explain the
modalities of scheduling.
5According to the APEC reports, the commitments for Thailand and Malaysia are still
under considerations. Will not consider these two countries any further. See 2016 APEC
Economy Progress in Implementing their Commitments to Reduce Tariﬀs on the 54 Prod-
ucts in the APEC List of Environmental Goods to Five Percent by the End of 2015, 2016
CTI Report to Ministers.
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In 2014, 14 WTO members (counting the EU as one6) initiated the EGA
negotiations. The number of negotiators has now risen to 18, representing 46
members. Negotiations were supposed to be completed by December 2016.
Recently, the two co-chairs, Mike Froman (US), and Cecilia Malmstrom (EU),
issued a statement to the eﬀect that negotiations had failed to conclude. The
process is now frozen but it does not mean that EGA has been abandonned and
negotiators are contemplating the next steps7. Failure to conclude the EGA
though, has not led to revocation of the APEC concessions, which continue to
apply. EGA negotiators followed the APEC model of “ex outs”, as Santana
(2015) explains in his account of the first phase of talks.
Finally, it is striking that the APEC ex outs have been used to enhance
environmental protection at home by improving access to "green" goods but
not to enhance environmental protection abroad. To provide but an illustration:
there are tariﬀ lines for solar heaters (as per the APEC list), but no tariﬀ lines for
the manner in which solar heaters have been produced in the exporting market.
So, even if a foreign country produces solar heaters in the most environment-
unfriendly manner, it will still receive a low tariﬀ for exporting an environmental
good to Home. APEC countries, in other words, do not appear to be concerned
about the environmental incidence of externalities at the production level but
solely at the consumption stage. This feature could, of course, change in the
future, as the negotiations is still ongoing, and more ex outs can always be
devised.
3 The outcome of the APEC agreement
This section discusses the outcome of the APEC agreement. Table 1 reports
on the mean, standard deviation and median of the tariﬀs imposed by the 21
countries participating in the APEC before (in 2015) and after the agreement
in the 54 product categories concerned by the agreement8. It is immediately
apparent that the agreeement is irrelevant for Hong Kong (China), Japan, Peru
and Singapore as these countries did not impose any tariﬀ for the products
concerned prior to the agreement. Table 2, which reports the change in the
mean and standard deviation in tariﬀs following the commitments, reveals that
Australia, New Zealand and Brunei did not make any change to their tariﬀs.
Hence, there are only 14 countries for which the APEC agreeement is at all rele-
vant. The highest reductions in average tariﬀs are found in Chile, China, Korea
and Mexico, with a reduction of roughly one percentage point. Russia (0.59)
and Taiwan (0.27) have an intermediate reduction in tariﬀs. The reduction is
6Counting the UK as part of the EU.
7There is potentially a lot at stake. For instance, the USTR estimates trade in environ-
mental goods to approximate $1 trillion in 2015 prices. The New Zealand Foreign Aﬀairs
and Trade Ministry estimates that trade in environmental goods will rise up to $3 trillion
by 2020.
8Descriptive statistics are computed over all independent tariﬀ lines, including ex outs
for boh years. As mentioned above, the tariﬀ commitments of Malaysia and Thailand are
still under negotiation.
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negligible in the US, The Philippines and Vietnam. In any event, the reduction
in the average tariﬀ is very modest.
Table 1:
M ea n 2 0 1 5 S t d .D e v . 2 0 1 6 M ed ia n 2 0 1 5 M e a n 2 0 1 6 S t d .D e v . 2 0 1 6 .1 M ed ia n 2 0 1 6
A u s t r a l i a 2.600 2.520 5 2.600 2.520 5
B ru n e i 1.970 2.450 0 1.970 2.450 0
C a n a d a 0.360 1.350 0 0.260 1.150 0
C h i l e 6 0 6 5 0 5
C h in a 5.010 5.680 5 3.990 4.290 5
Ta iw a n 1.950 2.740 0 1.680 2.300 0
H o n g K o n g 0 0 0 0 0 0
In d o n e s ia 5.060 2.160 5 4.970 2.050 5
J a p a n 0 0 0 0 0 0
K o r e a 6.130 3.290 8 5.170 3.030 5
M ex ic o 3.570 6.090 0 2.600 4.940 0
N ew Z e a la n d 3.110 2.440 5 3.110 2.440 5
P e ru 0 0 0 0 0 0
P h i l ip p in e s 1.660 1.790 1 1.560 1.510 1
P a p u a N ew G u in e a 0.270 2.020 0 0.090 0.670 0
R u s s ia 1.040 2.150 0 0.450 1.350 0
S in g a p o r e 0 0 0 0 0 0
U SA 1.580 2.320 0 1.510 2.180 0
V ie t n am 0.380 1.680 0 0.270 1.070 0
Table 2:
D iﬀ e r e n c e M e a n D iﬀ e r e n c e S t d .D e v .
A u s t r a l i a 0 0
B ru n e i 0 0
C a n a d a 0.100 0.619
C h i l e 1 0
C h in a 1.030 3.428
Ta iw a n 0.270 1.361
H o n g K o n g 0 0
In d o n e s ia 0.090 0.678
J a p a n 0 0
K o r e a 0.960 1.400
M ex ic o 0.960 2.840
N ew Z e a la n d 0 0
P e ru 0 0
P h i l ip p in e s 0.090 0.519
P a p u a N ew G u in e a 0.180 1.348
R u s s ia 0.590 1.771
S in g a p o r e 0 0
U SA 0.070 0.366
V ie t n am 0.110 0.750
These averages can however conceal significant disparities at the product
level. A list of the HS categories and ex out for which the members have
provided a reduction in tariﬀs can be obtained upon request. We observe
important individual reductions in China (up to 30 percentage points for one
product, a reduction of 20 percentage point for another products and roughly 10
percentage points for another two). Mexico has reduced tariﬀs by 10 percentage
points for as many as 22 ex outs. Russia has a tariﬀ reduction of 7.5 percentage
points for three products.
Table 3 considers the significance of the products for which concessions have
been made. We do not have trade data the level of the ex outs but only at the
HS 6 level. Hence, we assume that whenever a concession has been granted for
an ex out within an HS6 category, the concession applies to the overall value
of trade within the HS category. This is a very conservative assumption which
biases upwards our assessment of the significance of the concessions. We observe
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that the product category in which concessions have been made account for less
than six percent of overall imports in all countries concerned9.
Table 3: Overall imports impacted by tariﬀ reduction, as percentage of total
imports
Country % tot imports
Canada 0.117
Chile 2.53
China 2.53
Indonesia 0.041
Korea 5.995
Mexico 2.298
Philippines 0.027
Russia 1.114
USA 0.058
Vietnam 0.18
In order to further assess the significance of the concessions oﬀered by the
members, we consider, for each member, the value of imports for which it has
provided a concession as a percentage of the value of trade on which concessions
could have been granted in the context of the agreeement. This is measured
by the value of trade for which the import tariﬀs were strictly positive in 2015.
The results can be found in table 4, which also reports the weighted average
reduction in the tariﬀ (namely the reduction in tariﬀs, in percentage points,
weighted by the share of the value of imports that the product accounted for in
2015 in total imports of products in the APEC list for which tariﬀs were strictly
positive).
We observe that Korea and Mexico have made important concessions. The
former has reduced (trade weighted) tariﬀs by 5 percentage points on almost
all goods under the agreement. Mexico has granted a 11% (trade weighted)
reduction in tariﬀs for roughly 70% of its imports. Chile provides a very modest
(1%) reduction over all categories. Russia provides a moderate reduction (2.5%)
over 50% of its imports and China a 1% reduction over 26% of its imports. At
the other extreme, the concessions of the US are symbolic.
Finally, we consider whether the concessions have been concentrated in par-
ticular product category. Table 5 (available upon request) presents the overall
import values and trade weighted reductions in tariﬀs per HS category.
We observe that there are few product categories for which both the trade
weighted reduction in tariﬀs and overall trade is significant. Taking a 3% trade
weighted reduction in tariﬀs and overall trade in excess of a billion as thresholds,
we see that the impact is significant only for "Water filters" (8421.21), "Wind
9We consider overall imports of the products in which concessions have been made and
not only the imports from the APEC members as tariﬀ reductions are applied on a MFN
basis.
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Table 4: Total tariﬀ reductions
Country % of volumes for nonzero 2015 tariﬀs Weighed average reduction in tariﬀs
Canada 30.64 1.212
Chile 100 1
China 26.41 1.044
Indonesia 1.37 0.136
Korea 96.55 5.204
Mexico 69 11.914
Philippines 2.65 0.194
Russia 48.83 2.569
USA 1.52 0.082
Vietnam 23.28 3.432
Powered electric generating sets" (8502.31 and 8502.39) an" Optical measuring
and checking instruments" (9031.49). Overall, one should thus not overestimate
the aggregate significance of the APEC agreement.
4 APEC and EGA in the WTO
This section discusses how the APEC and EGA initiatives fit into the WTO.
We first discuss the options that the members of EGA faced in order to legalise
the agreement within the WTO. We subsequently focus on the option that
was adopted and discuss the legal status of the tariﬀ commitments under these
agreements.
4.1 Alternative options to insert EGA into the WTO
In principle, the negotiating members of the EGA could implement tariﬀ pref-
erences in favour of environmentally friendly goods through (i) a plurilateral
agreement (ii) a free-trade area (FTA) or by (iii) simply applying on MFN-basis
whatever preferences they had granted one another.
FTA was no option, assuming the negotiating partners wanted to observe
their WTO obligations. FTAs are GATT-consistent only if they liberalize sub-
stantially all trade. This condition was inserted because, as Grossman and
Helpman (1995) have argued, otherwise world of MFN à la carte could develop:
WTO members would be allowed to deviate from MFN even for one HS six-digit
classification. The goods featured in the APEC/EGA lists do not meet this
condition by any stretch of the imagination.
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Plurilateral agreements are scarce10 . The EGA would have been easier to
negotiate in a plurilateral context, since only like-minded players would have
participated anyway. Plurilateral agreements do not create rights and do not
impose obligations on non-participants (Article II.3 of the Agreement establish-
ing the WTO). Extension of benefits to non-participants would depend on new
applicants successfully negotiating their accession to the agreement, under the
terms eventually provided for in the EGA. Had all large players decided to par-
ticipate anyway, a number of outsiders would have been keen to join, in light of
the market advantages associated with entry.
Nevertheless, for a plurilateral agreement to be implemented, the member-
ship has to vote in favour by consensus (Article X.9 of the Agreement estab-
lishing the WTO). A negative vote could not have been discarded: producing
environment-friendly goods is likely to involve increases in fixed cost of pro-
duction. Small developing countries might find it hard to compete, especially
if environment-friendly production involves paying royalties to buy technology.
Anticipating a negative vote, probably, participants in the EGA discarded that
option.
The only option left was thus to declare ex ante that the product of their
negotiation would be extended to all on MFN-basis. By opting for the MFN
option, the framers of the EGA did ipso facto away with Article II.3 of the
Agreement Establishing the WTO. Rights are now created for non-participants,
without corresponding obligations. Extending MFN benefits, and accepting
widespread free-riding was anyway not that costly as the bigger markets had
agreed to participate as original members and most of the environment-relevant
technology was anyway in the hands of the original EGA members.
This option is however not totally risk free. To understand this risk, it is
important to explain the logic behind the HS classification as the backbone of
tariﬀ liberalisation.
4.2 The role of the HS classification in the GATT/WTO
As mentioned above, the GATT-think involves, hard disciplines on border mea-
sures (instruments) reduced through reciprocal commitments (see Baldwin, (1970)).
Softer disciplines are imposed on domestic measures aiming to avoid evisceration
of disciplines imposed on border measures: behind the border policies would be
unilaterally defined and, to the extent they shifted costs across national border,
would have to abide by the non-discrimination principle. Adherence to this
integration recipe guarantees that unilateral measures would not be burdening
imported goods more than they would burden domestic, competing goods. Non
discrimination served as an insurance policy against concession erosion. Thus,
trading partners would maintain their incentive to continue negotiating their
tariﬀ down, safe in the knowledge that the outcome of their negotiation would
not be undone through subsequent unilateral actions beyond their control.
Tariﬀ liberalization is predicated on some common understanding of the
10See Hoekman and Mavroidis (2015) for a discussion of plurilateral agreements.
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goods traded. This is exactly what the HS, the Harmonized System, is supposed
to do. It provides an agreed classification of goods from an aggregate (two-digit),
to a dis-aggregated (six-digit) level.
The World Customs Organization (WCO) is in charge of updating the clas-
sifications striving to develop a taxonomy that everyone finds useful. This is a
challenge, as names of goods correspond to national, often idiosyncratic prefer-
ences.
Because factors aﬀecting preferences diﬀer across diﬀerent societies, prefer-
ences across countries are asymmetric. The degree of diﬀerentiation is in direct
correlation with the degree of heterogeneity across societies. As the WTO has
almost the same membership with the United Nations, one can expect a signif-
icant dispersion of preferences so that goods will thus, often, be described in
diﬀerent manners.
The WCOmust do away with national preferences. To do that, it is naturally
led to describe goods in a way that does not reflect idiosyncratic preferences.
This leads to descriptions that are overwhelmingly functional, instead of de-
scriptions that insists on one characteristic of goods that might or might not
be its quintessential element. A spade is called a spade, instead of spade pro-
duced with fair-labour standards, or in environment-friendly manner. What is
fair-labour standards, or environment-friendly production, might have diﬀerent
meaning across societies.
GATT-Think is thus predicated on an HS that describes goods in environment-
neutral manner. GATT members remained of course, free to advance their
societal concerns through domestic, behind the border measures that they had
to apply in non-discriminatory manner. The GATT (and the WTO) after all is
about harmonization of conditions of competition within, and not across market
(see Horn and Mavroidis (2004)).
4.3 Legality of "ex outs" expressing national preferences
Over the years, as mentioned above, some trading nations moved to eight- or
more digit classifications. They did so in unilateral manner. Article 3.3 of HS
allows them to do so, provided that national descriptions are sub-classifications
of HS entries. Two questions arise. First, what is a sub-classification, or better,
when is sub-classification legitimate? And second, and related to the first, can a
WTO member introduce criteria or characteristics in a tariﬀ classification that
correspond to behind the border societal preferences?
Preferences can of course, in principle, be expressed through border as well
as domestic measures. In the GATT-world the second solution was privileged
simply because, as we have stated above, tariﬀ concessions could only be ex-
changed against a common language describing goods. Since pro-environment
or pro-labour standards were not common across participants, the common de-
scription of goods had to be based on functional properties of described goods.
This was the advantage of the HS classification, and this is why it was privileged,
and provided the basis for tariﬀ concessions in the GATT-world.
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Domestic policies, that had to observe non-discrimination, would emerge
against the background of tariﬀ concessions expressed in regulation-neutral
terms. Recall, and this is the key, tariﬀ concessions take place following recip-
rocal negotiations to this eﬀect. Nothing of course, stops WTO members from
negotiating at the eight- or higher digit level, if their national classifications
observe Article 3.3 of HS. Assertion of national preferences will thus arise at
the border when negotiations take place at at the eight- or higher digit level.
The APEC/EGA initiatives involve the assertion of preferences at the bor-
der. However, the very fact that a product classification is inserted into a sched-
ule does not make it ipso facto legal under WTO law. The Appellate Body
report on EC-Bananas III has made it unambiguously clear that the legality
of schedules of concessions can be challenged after the end of the negotiations.
This view rests on two grounds. First, from a practical perspective, it is prob-
ably a quixotic test to expect a consensus decision on the legality of each and
every concession at the end of a trade round across players with divergent incen-
tives. Second, and more substantially, allowing WTO members to pronounce
on the legality of their own actions violates the letter and the spirit of Art 23.2
DSU. This is the quintessential provision of DSU to the extent that it explains
that the WTO is third party compulsory adjuction system ("nemo judex in
causa sua"). There is thus, no guarantee that the concessions granted under
APEC/EGA are lawful, and thus they can be challenged before the WTO.
What could the argument be, in case a challenge has been mounted? Assume
Home and Foreign produce an environment-friendly and -unfriendly good, and
that the two goods compete in the market of an EGA signatory where Home
faces say a 5% tariﬀ, and Foreign a 10% tariﬀ. Foreign challenges the measure
arguing the two goods are like so that the EGA and its ex outs violate the MFN
principle. How would a panel address the issue?
It is very likely that a panel would conclude the products are like. The
reasons are as follows; the concept of likeness that is relevant is likeliness under
Art 1 (MFN, in particular for custom’s duties) and the case law of the AB has
defined likeness under Art 1 in terms whether goods belong to the same 6 digit
classification. In Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, which was a dispute under Art
III of the Gatt, the AB defined likeness in this way. The panel on Japan—SPF
Dimension Lumber, which was a dispute under Art I of GATT, provided an
explicit acknowledgment of the relevance of tariﬀ classification as the dominant
criterion to establish likeness (§§ 5.11—12). One can also expect that the analysis
of likeness under Art III to be more "expansive" (see Hudec (2000)). It is
striking in this respect that the AB in Japan-Alcoholic beverage did not deviate
from its approach under Article I of GATT. Since here we deal with a border
instrument, two goods that come under the same 6 digit classification, will thus
in all likelihood, be judged like goods. Under the premise following from the
case law of the AB that goods at the same 6 digit are like, goods belonging to
diﬀerent 8 digit levels which are subdivisions of the same 6 digit, are thus like
because they share the same 6 digit classification.
The fact that products belonging to diﬀerent 8 digit subdivisions should be
recognised as like has two consequences. First, it calls into question the moti-
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vation of the EGA members to attempt to distinguish between these two goods
in first place; there is a disconnect between the attempt to diﬀerentiate between
goods and the fact that they will be recognised as like from a legal perspective.
Second, it raises the prospect that diﬀerential market access granted to two
goods belonging to diﬀerent 8 digit classification will be discriminatory. The
issue is not de jure discrimination (which requires diﬀerentiation by origin) but
de facto discrimination. This would arise for instance if the ex out were defined
in such a way as providing better market access for some countries. If de facto
discrimination was found, the approach of the EGA to reflect preferences by
granting better access for ex outs would be deemed unlawful.
One way out of this policy conundrum is to understand likeness under Art 1
in terms of its policy dimension for classification beyond the 6 digit level. A def-
inition of likeness in terms of a policy dimension however requires an assessment
of whether the policy dimension is authentic or a means to discriminate. This
assessment can be undertaken by importing elements from Art XX of GATT,
TBT or SPS. For instance, a test can be formulated in terms of necessity or
consistency.
WTO members concerned could of course, also invoke Article XX of GATT
to justify their measures. The problem with this approach though, is that
it does not respond to the question "why allow for sub-classifications as per
Article 3.3 of HS, if eventually, they will be judged inconsistent with Article
I and II of GATT, and will have to be justified through recourse to Article
XX of GATT"? Furthermore, this approach does not provide an end to the
discussion, as complaints might multiply, and each time WTO courts will be
asked to pronounce on the consistency of a diﬀerent (or even the same) sub-
classification with multilateral rules. Our solution takes case of the problem
once and for all.
This approach would actually be similar to that advocated by the AB in EC
Tariﬀ Preferences. In this case, the AB did not accept any policy intervention to
justify diﬀerential tariﬀ treatments but only those policies relying on objective
criteria. Although the AB did not define "objective criteria", the idea must have
been that this requirement would guarantee that benefits could not be targeted
to specific recipients. Consequently, no question of de facto discrimination could
arise.
It is also worth noting that the question of a possible challenge of the EGA
construct with respect to national treatment does not arise. It is simply im-
material whether the importing state produces or not one of the two (or any
of the two) types of goods. National treatment will not be violated anyway as
it covers only internal measures. This obligation applies only after goods have
been cleared through the customs.
However, the better market access provided to green goods produced abroad
also aﬀects the relative positions of environmentally unfriendly (brown) goods
produced domestically and those produce abroad. The lower tariﬀ on foreign
green goods acts like a tax on foreign brown goods and foreign producers will
have an incentive to switch production towards green goods. There is no equiv-
alent measure for domestic production. Domestic producers of brown goods will
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face a stronger competitive pressure from the foreign producers of green goods
but this eﬀect is likely to be weaker than the eﬀect felt by foreign producers
of brown goods (to the extent goods produced abroad are closer substitute to
one another than goods produced in diﬀerent countries). As a consequence,
domestic producers of brown goods benefit from a more favourable treatment
that producers of foreign brown goods.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has argued that while the APEC and EGA agreements involve a
shift in the way in which policy preferences are expressed in the WTO, they are
not immune from a challenge in terms of MFN provisions. These initiatives are
still remarkable in a number of respects.
First, these initiatives involve a change of paradigm with respect to the mo-
tivation underlying the determination of tariﬀs. The prevailing view is that
tariﬀs are determined within the GATT/WTO as an exchange of market access
which improves on the outcome of unilateral tariﬀ setting which otherwize op-
timise the terms of trade. Each country reduces tariﬀs below what would be
(unilaterally) optimal for some imports in exchange for a reduction of the tariﬀ
that trading partners would apply to its exports. The APEC and EGA intia-
tives introduce environmental protection as another motivation when deciding
on the level of tariﬀs. They thus improve market access for a class of goods
that signatories believe should be traded on preferential terms. But nothing
would prevent to modulate tariﬀs according to other public policy concerns.
When setting their tariﬀs, APEC signatories were not thinking only of their
terms of trade, but also in terms of environmental protection. In fact, for
some participants like China, with substantial bargaining power, it seems that
the latter motive dominated the former, since it did not receive major tariﬀ
concessions from its partners with significant market power. Indeed, the United
States made only insignificant tariﬀ concessions, as we have seen in this paper.
This observation, in and of itself, casts doubt as to whether the terms of trade
theory11, eloquently used as the framework to explain the GATT (where tariﬀ
classifications were expressed in terms void of any regulatory content) is the
only relevant framework in a world where the level of tariﬀs agreed is often the
expression of mixed motives (in our case, environmental concerns, as well as the
continuing strive to improve terms of trade).
Even from the narrower perspective of tariﬀ preferences, these initiatives are
significant. Up until then, tariﬀ preferences were granted mostly in favour of
developing countries and did not involve any form of regulatory conditional-
ity. Indeed, some WTO members occasionally implemented tariﬀ preferences
conditional on regulation. The litigation on EC-Tariﬀ Preferences, where the
EU conditioned tariﬀ reduction upon adoption of policies to combat production
and traﬃcking of drugs is a case to the point. The APEC/EGA initiative nev-
11 See Bagwell and Staiger (2002).
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ertheless, goes much beyond and is not confined to preferences for developing
countries. It is preferences for all that produce environmental goods.
Second, it is remarkable that policy preferences are expressed collectively. In
the context of the traditional approach, policies preferences are expressed trough
domestic regulations, without explicit coordination across members (at least in
the WTO), reflecting the fact that the WTO regime was conceived in temrs
of negative integration. The APEC and EGA initiatives by contrast involve
some coordination on the expression of policy preferences (at the very least
with respect to the list of goods subject to the agreement). Twenty-one WTO
members so far have expressed a joint preference and it is a remarkable instance
in which the provision of a public good takes place through trade instuments.
Third, it is also worth noting that the EGA/APEC initiatives are not multi-
lateral and from that perspective are part of a trend. Indeed, since the advent
of the WTO, there has not been any successful multilateral tariﬀ negotiation.
More generally, except for the Agreements on Aid for Trade, and Trade Facili-
tation, two initiatives largely designed towards helping with development eﬀorts
of the developing countries members of the WTO, there has been no successful
multilateral negotiation for over twenty years now under the aegis of the WTO.
The various initiatives that were successfully concluded (like the Agreements on
Information Technology, ITA I, and ITA II), were de facto plurilateral agree-
ments. Participants agreed to negotiate even though the whole membership
was not in agreement to do so, and did not seek for authorization to implement
their results (as they should under the relevant provisions concerning plurilat-
eral agreements). They simply went ahead and did so when a critical mass
of members had locked in tariﬀ concessions (so as to reduce the potential for
free-riding), and further agreed to implement their results on nondiscrimina-
tory (MFN) basis. As Hoekman and Mavroidis (2015) explain, the increasing
heterogeneity of the WTO membership has had an impact on the number of
multilateral agreements that can plausibly become credible negotiating items at
the WTO.
Viewed from this perspective, the APEC/EGA initiative is thus part of a
recent trend to negotiate among few. Arguably, APEC/EGA goes one step
further than ITA I & II, since the original signatories did not even condition
the extension of the trade advantages on an MFN-basis upon first guaranteeing
that a critical mass of producers had acceded to their arrangement. This is
of course a disturbing trend which raises questions about the role of the WTO.
These questions are however beyond the scope of this paper.
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